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Summary
The debate on the effectiveness of Private Security Contractors (PSCs) in Iraq has been waged ever since their first appearance. Statists have argued that they are much less effective than regular troops, while neoliberals consider them an effective supplement to regular troops. However, so far, both schools alike have drawn on anecdotal evidence only, yet such evidence is prone to a high margin of error and does not allow a comparison of different actors. This article addresses these shortfalls by providing hard data, drawn from the Wikileaks “Iraq War logs” dataset, on the conduct of PSC in Iraq and comparing their performance to that of regular troops, i.e., the US and Iraqi armed forces. In general, if PSCs are co-deployed alongside regular troops and oversight is institutionalized, their performance supersedes that of poorly trained military personnel, such as the Iraqi military, and in many cases even that of the highly capable US military.
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The Effectiveness of Contracted Coalitions – Private Security Contractors in Iraq

Although the employment of Private Security Contractors (PSCs) alongside armed forces is almost a decade old, their presence in warzones is still a matter of debate. Normatively, the controversy is essentially concerned with the balance of market and state competencies regarding the use of force. Statists prefer the state’s monopoly​[1]​ and thus argue that the use of force should remain the exclusive domain of the state and armed contractors should be phased out or banned.​[2]​ Neoliberals, in contrast, are skeptical about the state’s monopoly of force, as it might be use to subdue people.​[3]​ Accordingly, they prefer a division of the coercive means between the state and the market.​[4]​ 
Aside from their normative dispute, statists and neoliberals also disagree fundamentally on the effectiveness of market and state coalitions. Statists consider co-deployed PSCs to be an impediment that prevents the regular military from converting its resources into fighting power, i.e., an obstacle to effectiveness.​[5]​ PSCs are deemed “mercenaries” or “dogs of war”​[6]​ that are reckless and create chaos on the battlefield.​[7]​ However, neoliberal proponents have claimed that by and large, PSCs do not behave any worse than the regular military.​[8]​ Moreover, they have increased the effectiveness of military operations by providing needed capabilities and additional manpower.​[9]​ 
Due to the lack of data, neither of these claims has been conclusively put to the test so far. Most studies simply provide positive or negative “anecdotal evidence” and draw their conclusions accordingly.​[10]​ However, this is not without risks, as such examples might be misleading. For instance, such evidence can be inconclusive, as sometimes the actions of the same firm provide arguments for advocates and opponents alike. For many critics, the in Baghdad’s Nisour Square incident, where Blackwater/Xe security guards allegedly killed 17 Iraqi civilians epitomizes the wrongness of the privatization trend, while Blackwater’s rescue of the Polish ambassador nicely illustrates the benefits that PSCs are able to provide.​[11]​ Furthermore, there is the temptation to use anecdotal evidence as the basis for biased interpretations, depending on one’s normative point of view. Congressman Elijah Cummings (D-MA), for instance, considered the 195 escalation of force incidents by a security company over a two-year period evidence of a “shoot first culture”.​[12]​ However, without an adequate control group operating under similar circumstances, it is impossible to say if 1.4 shootings on average per week in a conflict zone is evidence of aggressive or restrained behavior. 
The article seeks to remedy this shortfall by providing a test of both views against hard data. To this end, the Wikileaks “Iraq War logs” data set is used as a source.​[13]​ The data set contains approximately 400’000 field reports of the US armed forces on the Iraq operation between 2004 and 2009, including information on PSCs. The following analysis proceeds in the following steps: In the first section, the theoretical background of both schools, “statists” and “neoliberals”, are outlined and more specific hypotheses on the conduct and effects of military and private security forces are delineated. The second section addresses methodological questions on the quality of the data set and on how the individual hypotheses are operationalized. In the third section, the hypotheses are tested against the available data, and contractor behavior is compared to two control groups in the same area of operation, the US and the Iraqi armed forces. 

The debate on PSC deployment
Statists and neoliberals fundamentally disagree about the proper balance of the state and the market in military coalitions.​[14]​ Statists admit that contractors have to offer benefits to the armed forces, yet they want to limit their contributions to non-armed support because the inadvertent effects of armed contractors outweigh the benefits.​[15]​ Likewise, most neoliberals do not question the primary role of regular military forces on the battlefield. However, they believe there is a role for armed contractors’ support and do not share the dire statist expectations about the effects.​[16]​ 
 	Statists consider state armed forces to be the most effective vehicles to accomplish specific military aims. Modern armed forces are highly organized and specialized bureaucracies. They are particularly designed to implement assigned tasks effectively under conditions of uncertainty. To be effective, bureaucracies have developed procedures and means according to which they operate in order to negate external interference and increase the likelihood of success.​[17]​ In the military context, doctrine, which is basically a common set of behavioral rules and procedures, is the main mechanism to fulfill this purpose.​[18]​ First, rules and procedures provide a reference framework for coordination, assign tasks, determine competencies, and guide the efforts of the members of the organization.​[19]​ Such shared knowledge increases effectiveness by reducing friction, i.e., the risk of failure through misunderstanding or lack of communication.​[20]​ Second, doctrinal rules and procedures control behavior by defining the “rules of the game”, i.e., what is considered an appropriate course of action.​[21]​ The appropriateness of the employed means is also a dimension of effectiveness, as brute force alone usually fails to achieve the political goal for which force is being employed.​[22]​ In the military, the application of force is highly regulated by the rules of engagement (ROE). Though the amount of force considered appropriate might vary across different militaries,​[23]​ ROE always have a restricting effect, as they define specific standards for proper actions and thus exclude other options of action. Finally, the hierarchical structure of bureaucracies ensures compliance with the rules as supervision and review of their application is part of the all-day business.​[24]​ If non-compliance occurs, organizations always have disciplinary measures at hand to sanction their members.
According to statists, markets lack the characteristics that render bureaucracies effective, i.e., common guidance standards, coordinated actions, and a hierarchical control structure.​[25]​ Markets bring together a heterogeneous group of actors without providing a set of commonly shared objectives or any specific standards. As a result, the actions of the different market participants are not coordinated, and actions might easily conflict, resulting in friction.​[26]​ Hence, if PSCs are deployed alongside state forces in a coalition, their actions are expected to sow confusion on the battlefield and increase friction substantially, thus decreasing effectiveness.​[27]​  Marine Col. John Toolan gives an example of possible frictions. According to him many of the contractors in Iraq did not have knowledge of the military communication system, which lead to coordination problems.​[28]​

Furthermore, the market does not provide restraints for the use of force. Since avoiding collateral damage entails costs for market actors,​[29]​ PSCs are expected to be extremely violent actors, looting and killing at random.​[30]​ Even if contracts, for instance, contain behavioral rules, the absence of a coherent oversight structure makes it almost impossible to supervise their implementation.​[31]​ In July 2005, the deputy commander of the 3rd Infantry Division in Iraq, U.S. Army Brigadier General Karl Horst, underscored this point: “These guys run loose in this country and do stupid stuff. There's no authority over them, so you can't come down on them hard when they escalate force….”.​[32]​
In essence, the statist school suggests that state forces are more effective than PSCs, as they are better coordinated and more restrained in the application of force. Since PSCs lack common rules for coordination and restraint, they reduce effectiveness in a coalition. 
Neoliberals do not share the pessimistic view of market-state coalitions in war. On the contrary, they doubt that the contemporary all-public force is the most effective way to produce the desired outcome. Indeed, neoliberals will readily admit that historically, state-organized forces were a proper solution to provide security, yet today, this model might not be the most efficient anymore.​[33]​ However, this is not to say that neoliberals want to replace the state’s armed forces entirely. In fact, only a few are willing to consider PSC operations independent of state armed forces.​[34]​ The argument is rather that “while war-fighting is sovereign, not all activities of military forces are obviously so.”​[35]​ In contrast to statists, neoliberals assume that market solutions, including armed contractor support, can improve the state’s military capability in state-building operations.​[36]​ James Carafano, for instance, regards the use of contractors in combat as potentially offering the “greatest competitive advantage in the twenty-first century”.​[37]​  A high level official in the Department of Defense went even further and claimed that “we [the US armed forces] need contractors. They provide flexibility you can’t get from the service”.​[38]​
A good part of the additional effectiveness postulated by neoliberals is due to a broader understanding of effectiveness, which includes also efficiency. Parsimony of resources is more important on markets than in than the state bureaucracy, which leads to reduced costs in general.​[39]​ However, even if efficiency is not factored in, neoliberals bring arguments in favor of market actors to the table. First, neoliberals readily admit that the military operates according to common standards and that this increases effectiveness. However, most operations are nowadays conducted by coalitions of forces. The implicit statist assumption is that state-state coalitions simply add the capabilities of their armed forces and thereby create a more potent force.​[40]​ This might be too optimistic, as different armed forces operate according to different doctrines and under their own command structure. Hence, such arrangements suffer from multiple chains of commands, different standards, and often discrepancies in capability between the different units.​[41]​ The effectiveness of state-state coalitions is therefore not guaranteed. Indeed, compatibility problems might likewise occur in a PSC-state coalition. However, many PSCs have a military background, and are hence trained according to similar standards or higher standards than military coalition forces and offer, through the contractual relations, a clearer chain of command than multinational forces.​[42]​ Neoliberals therefore assume that PSC-state coalitions and state-state coalitions will offer at least equal quality of coordination. 
Second, neoliberals object to the statist portrayal of PSCs as being violent and lacking any common standards. A representative of the Department of Defense argued that the risk associated with contractors is no greater than with Marines, who are also aggressive and make mistakes.​[43]​ Indeed, there are incidents of wrongdoings by PSCs, yet they cannot be attributed to a lack of common standards. PSCs share a set of professional standards. Professionalism defines the kind of expertise necessary for the occupation, and provides norms and rules of appropriate behavior.​[44]​ Admittedly, the PSC profession is still developing; however, a net of common standards already exists. A first indicator is that the industry almost unanimously rejects combat services as being too controversial. Dominick Donald claims that PSCs would not carry out combat operations, because the sector has spent much time separating itself from the mercenary combat end of the private security spectrum.​[45]​ Furthermore, PSCs employees often shared a common professional socialization. Many of the operators have a military background. In many cases Western PSCs operators have served in armed forces, which are trained according similar military standards.​[46]​ Since Western armed forces routinely run training programs for foreign militaries, e.g., the US armed forces in Latin America, some non-western PSC operators are also familiar with these standards. Hence, many PSCs therefore have a common set of coordinating and restraining norms. On the corporate level, a framework of corporate responsibility is developing. The US PSC association, the International Stability Organizations Association, and the British Association of Private Security Companies require their members to commit themselves to a Voluntary Code of Conduct. A clear goal of this initiative is to help to distinguish companies that want to operate in a legitimate fashion from others. However, the formulation of codes of conduct is also an expression of what activities are considered illegitimate and requires members to uphold human rights.​[47]​ Additionally, the Swiss government has initiated the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers, which also outlines standards of appropriate behavior. The code strengthens respect for human rights and humanitarian law and has been signed by 70 international companies. ​[48]​  
Finally, neoliberals agree that oversight is required to assure compliance with norms, yet they do not agree that the market lacks such norms altogether. They regard the market as a social institution “where repeated exchange occurs between buyer and seller” and formal and informal rules govern the “relations between competitors, suppliers, and costumers”.​[49]​ Market participants comply with the rules, because they realize that in the long run, trade would fail without such rules.​[50]​ Accordingly, actors are punished with decreasing demand if they disregard common standards by neglecting their contractual obligations or committing criminal acts.​[51]​ In essence, neoliberals argue that professional PSCs adhere to common standards due to their fear of bad publicity and desire for future profit.​[52]​ However, neoliberals admit that the strength of control depends on the strength of the oversight system, i.e., the ability to gather the necessary information, which might be difficult on a vast market or in a war zone.​[53]​ 
In essence, neoliberals therefore do not expect PSCS to be less effective than the regular military. A prominent proponent of this view is former U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus who considered PSCs an adequate substitute for regular forces in some areas: “the reason we have them [PSCs] there is that we don’t have the forces to perform some of those missions”.​[54]​ Accordingly, neoliberals expect a PSC-state coalition to pose less problems regarding cooperation and to apply force with equal restraint as in state-state coalitions. Hence, in co-deployed operations, PSCs should actually contribute to the effectiveness of the overall military operations.  

Methodological considerations
The analysis of the article is based on the documents of the “Iraq War log” files as made available to the public by the internet platform “Wikileaks” in September 2010. In total, almost 392’000 documents were released, all of which are military field reports. Field reports are usually produced by US military units in the event of an “incident”, e.g., an enemy attack, friendly fire, the discovery of a weapons stash, or a traffic accident. 
Most pertinent to the analysis in this paper are reports that describe the involvement or the operation of PSCs. However, the identification of PSC incidents was sometimes difficult, since Wikileaks redacted the names of all units. Fortunately, all reports contained detailed descriptions of the events. Two reports are included in the textbox below as illustrative examples.




Textbox 1: Example of field reports
Blue on Blue incident on 12/15/2004; No Casualties reportedAT 151355CDEC04 ____ BDE [Brigade] REPORTED THAT SABRE SECURITY VEHICLE WERETRAVELLING FROM BASRAH TO ____ WHEN ROUNDS WERE FIRED FROM TOP COVER SENTRY IN THE MIDDLE OF A ____-STRONG US FUEL TANKER CONVOY TO THE FRONT AND REAR OF THE LAST VEHICLE IN THE SABRE CONVOY USING ____ AND ____ CAL [Caliber].Blue on Green incident on 13/11/2005; Six Casualties reportedAT 1545C, ___ REPORTS A MINISTRY OF HEALTH CONVOY WAS FIRED UPON BY US SOF [Special Operation Forces]. CURRENTLY 2X CIV [Civilian] KIA [Killed in Action], 4X CIV WIA [Wounded in Action] (2X URGENT, 2X PRIORITY). THERE ARE A TOTAL OF 4X VEHICLES ON FIRE. SOME OF THE VEHICLES HAVE AMMUNITION IN THEM AND IS COOKING OFF.  ___ A. ___ , THE  ___ OF HEALTH WAS IN THE CONVOY, HE IS FINE, NOT INJURED.  ___ REQUESTS AIR MEDEVAC FOR 2X CIV WIA URGENT CASUALTIES (1X HAS GSW [Gun Shot Wound] TO ___, 1X HAS GSW TO ___).  AIR MEDEVAC CANCELED DUE TO CIV AMBULANCES ARRIVING ON SCENE. 1X URGENT CASUALTY HAS DOW [Died of Wounds]. HHC (Headquarters and Headquarters Company]___ REPORTS ___ HMMWV [High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle] ___ WERE ESCORTING 2X ___ TRUCKS FROM FOB [Forward Operating Base]     ___ THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH CONVOY BECAUSE THEY SAW WEAPONS IN THE VEHICLES AND THOUGHT THEY WERE AIF [Anti Iraqi Force]. THE PSD [Private Security Detail] WAS ENGAGED AT APPROX. ___ HOURS. THE ___ PSD CONSISTED OF THREE VEHICLES AND ___ PAX. OF THE FOUR VEHICLES THAT WERE ENGAGED, ___ WERE ___ PSD VEHICLES AND ___ WAS A CIVILIAN VEHICLE. THIS FOLLOW UP REPORT ALSO INDICATED IT WAS A US SOF UNIT. THIS UNIT CONTINUED TO CAMP____.  D___ REPORTS THE VEHICLES HAVE BEEN DRUG OFF THE ROAD ONTO THE SERVICE ROAD. TRAFFIC FLOW   ___ APPROX ___ MINUTES.  VEHICLES ARE OFF THE ROAD AWAITING US RECOVERY ASSETS TO REMOVE THE HULKS,    ___ UNTIL THEY ARE REMOVED. NORMAL TRAFFIC FLOW HAS CONTINUED.  UPON DEBRIEF, 2X VEHICLES WERE ___ PSD VEHICLES AND 2X VEHICLES WERE CIVILIAN VEHICLES NOT ASSOCIATED WITH THE PSD.  RECOVERY ASSETS LAUNCHED TO RECOVER THE VEHICLES HULKS.  HULKS RECOVERED. IN ROUTE ___ TO CAMP  ___ CLOSED

The content of the reports could therefore be used to identify contractor involvement. An incident was categorized as PSC-related if the name of a firm or terms such as “armed civilian personnel”, “local guard”, or “PSD [Personal Security Detail]” were mentioned. Overall, 68 PSC related incidents were identified and included in the analysis. 
However, there are some factors that might impair our ability to draw general conclusions from the data set. First, only documents that were classified as “unclassified”, “confidential”, or “secret” are included; the “top secret” documents, if there are any, are missing. Second, it is not clear whether all reports of the “unclassified”, “confidential”, and “secret” categories are included in the data set. Thus, the possibility remains that the data represents only a portion of all documents. However, due to the vast size of the available data  almost 400’000 documents  and the continuous documentation, the assumption of a fairly comprehensive dataset is justified. Third, the individual field reports themselves constitute another source of insecurity. Field reports might be prone to misrepresentation and errors since they were composed by military personnel in a war zone. Time pressure, fatigue, or combat stress might distort the recollection of the events. In order to correct for such potential errors, the findings are compared with existing data. In case all data should point in the same direction, the conclusions can be said to rest on a fairly strong basis.
In order to probe the hypotheses of the statists and neoliberals, it is important to translate them into observable events. A sound measure for the ability to cooperate is the number of friendly fire incidents (1’269 in total). The assumption is that the better units are coordinated, the less friendly fire incidents will occur. Friendly fire is the inadvertent firing on friendly troops. This overarching category contains six distinct sub-categories: First, the “blue on blue” (BB) category comprises coalition troops firing at each other. Second, the categories “blue on green” (BG) or “green on blue” (GB) refer to friendly or coalition troops firing at or being fired upon by host nation forces. Third, “green on green” (GG) refers to incidents where host nation forces fired upon each other. Finally, “blue on white” (BW) and “green on white” (GW) refer to incidents where either coalition or host nation forces fire at civilians.​[55]​ It is noteworthy that the likelihood of the different categories being covered in the dataset varies. The format of the reports logically implies that only incidents that were either observed by US forces or wherein they participated are covered. However, it is of crucial difference for the coverage of the categories whether the reporting unit observed an event is observed or was party to it. The BB, GB, BG, and BW categories require the participation of US forces. Thus, based on the assumption that the US forces produced a field report for all events in which they were involved, these categories can be considered comprehensive, i.e., they cover all events that took place. In contrast, GG and GW incidents do not require participation of US forces, hence they could have taken place regardless of whether they are observed or not. These categories therefore only represent a sample of all events. However, if PSCs are added to the equation, the situation becomes more complicated. The “blue” and “green” categories no longer only comprise military personnel, but international (blue) and local PSCs (green) as well.​[56]​ This again changes the coverage as the number of possible actor relations within each subcategory increases. As a consequence, the BB category not only encompasses military incidents, but engagements between the military and PSCs, and PSCs and PSCs as well (Table 1). Coverage-wise, the BB category comprises the military engagements and PSC-military events comprehensively, but not incidents between PSCs. Additionally, incidents where PSCs fired upon civilians (BW, GW), as well as friendly fire incidents between international contractors and local PSCs or only local PSCs (BG, GB, GG) occurred without US participation as well, and thus the data set contains only a sample of all such events. It is noteworthy that the entire data set does not contain any information on PSC-PSC incidents. However, since theses events had the same likelihood of being observed as other events, the fact that none have been reported is a strong indicator that such incidents have happened very rarely. 


Table 1



The variation in coverage of the categories has repercussion on the analysis. Since most of the analysis is based on the absolute numbers, it could distort the results if a category with comprehensive data were to be compared to a category with only a sample of information. In the case of comparisons between PSC and Iraqi forces, the analysis makes use of all categories. Since the dataset provided for both actors has a similar amount of comprehensive and sample categories, the likelihood of error is the same. In the case of the US military and PSCs, the categories need to be separated, as the dataset provides sample and comprehensive categories for PSCs and only comprehensive ones for US forces. The analysis therefore refers only to the BB category, as that is almost comprehensive for both cases. A small margin of error remains, since the PSC-on-PSC friendly fire category cannot be comprehensive. However, as not a single incident was observed, the impact of these rare events on any results is considered negligible. 
The potential aggressiveness is measured by the number of casualties that resulted from firefights with PSC involvement and the number of firefights that were initiated by PSCs. Determining the number of casualties was straightforward, as each field report contained detailed data on this topic. However, it was more difficult to pinpoint who had initiated the firefight. In most of the cases, the reports describe the order of events, making it possible to identify the initiator. The assumption is that the degree of aggressiveness correlates with the number of casualties and initiated firefights, i.e., the more aggressive an actor is, the more casualties are caused and the more firefights are initiated. However, the mere number of incidents involving PSCs, the number of casualties resulting from incidents with PSC involvement, and the number of PSC-initiated firefights do not allow any conclusions to be drawn. In order to be able to evaluate PSC behavior, data of actors who operate under similar circumstances are required. As the statist-neoliberal disagreement is about the regular military forces and PSCs, the US and Iraqi armed forces are chosen as control groups. The question is therefore whether PSCs’ performance is better or worse compares to that of the US and Iraqi armed forces. Furthermore, the number of deployed PSCs and of US and Iraqi troops needs to be factored into the comparison. Unsurprisingly, as there are more US troops deployed in Iraq than PSCs, the US armed forces have produced more incidents. The question is therefore whether PSCs were proportionally more involved in friendly fire incidents. If this were the case, it would support the statist point of view that PSCs are an impediment to coordination. Moreover, if they caused proportionally more casualties and initiated proportionally more firefights, this would support the statist point of view that PSCs are more aggressive than regular military forces. If PSCs turned out to cause proportionally at least an equal or less number of incidents, casualties, or firefights as regular military forces, the neoliberal argument is supported. 
 
More harm than good? 
In total, 68 PSC related incidents are on record, which represents 5.4% of all friendly fire incidents (1’269), while the Iraqi forces accounted for 50.5% and the US forces contributed 44.1%. However, the results might be misleading, since they are based on data across all categories. Nevertheless, with regard to the PSCs’ share, it seems to point in the right direction. If only the BB category is analyzed, PSCs similarly accounted for only 5.9% of all incidents, while the US armed forces were responsible for the remaining share (367 BB in total, including 22 PSC-Mil. incidents).  
However, the mere share does not give any indication as to the real impact PSCs had on the quality of cooperation. In order to evaluate the performance, it has to be put in relation to the size of the contingent and compared to that of other actors. However, it is difficult to determine the number of PSCs in the country at any point in time. In 2005, the US Department of Defense (DoD) estimated that about 60 firms were operating in the country, while the Private Security Company Association of Iraq put the number to approximately 181, and The New York Times calculated that round about 310 companies from all over the world did business in Iraq.​[57]​ Similarly, the total number of armed security personnel varies. From 2003 to 2007, the number of armed contractors was estimated to have increased from 10’000 to approximately 30’000 or 40’000 (Table 2).​[58]​ The number of US troops in the country is easier to determine. In 2003, there were approximately 150’000 troops in the country; in 2004, the number dropped to 130’000, and it increased again in 2007 to 160’000.​[59]​ With regards to the Iraqi Army, after its dissolution in 2003, the US started to train and build up the new Iraqi armed forces. The number of Iraqi units ready to participate in the fighting grew constantly from 5’000 in 2003 to 143’000 in 2009.​[60]​ 


Table 2

The average contingent size over the period 2003 to 2009 was therefore the following: US troops: 145’000; PSCs: 21’000; and Iraqi Army: 85’000. 
The US military units were involved in 345 BB incidents, which translates into one incident per 420 US troops. If this is taken as a measure for sound cooperation, any contingent added to the US force that causes the ratio to fall would be an impediment to cooperation. Adding the Iraqi forces to the total force resulted in an additional 347 friendly fire incidents with the US forces (BG, GB). As a consequence, the ratio deteriorated to one incident per 332 members of the coalition ([145.000+ 80.000]/692). The Iraqi Army had therefore a negative impact on overall coordination. In contrast, PSCs and the US military were involved in 22 incidents. The addition of the PSC contingent had a positive impact, as the ratio improved to one incident per 452 members of the coalition ([145.000+21.000]/367). The discrepancy becomes even more apparent if the number of incidents is broken down to the individual contingents. In the Iraqi case, one in 245 soldiers was involved in a friendly fire incident with US troops, while in the case of PSCs, only every 954.4th employee exchanged fire with US troops. In essence, PSC do not appear to be a liability regarding coordination. The resulting significantly lower incidents-to-troops ratio supports the neoliberal view. However, the picture becomes more complex if the data is disaggregated. According to the timeline (Table 3), the presence of PSCs appears to have caused more confusion in the beginning than later in the operation.

Table 3

This trend is noteworthy, as it is runs counter to the curve of violence in Iraq. Until 2007, violence was on the rise in Iraq. Attacks on Iraqi infrastructure, bombs, ambushes, and rocket attacks almost tripled from 600 in April 2004 to an all-time peak of 1’800 in July 2007.​[61]​ However, during the same period, incidents involving PSCs decreased. The statist argument cannot account for this development, as it instead suggests a constantly poor performance due to the lack of common rule and oversight. Neoliberals, in contrast, have argued that the PSCs and the military share rules, and that norm compliance depends on the quality of the oversight regime. The development seems to support this assumption. While oversight was poor in the beginning, the number of incidents decreases with the institutionalization of coordination between the military and PSCs. Over the course of the Iraq war, the US armed forces undertook two steps to remedy the problems. In October 2004, the Reconstruction Operation Center (ROC) was established. The DoD contracted with the British firm Aegis Defence Security Ltd. to establish the ROC and five regional branches in order to provide a coordination interface, common procedures, and a shared operating picture.​[62]​ Another important step was taken in 2007, when the Headquarters of the Multinational Force Iraq issued Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 07-428 with additional rules for PSCs’ use of force, escalation of force, and traffic practice for the first time.​[63]​ Finally, six Contractor Operation Cells (CONOC) were established in early 2008, which meant increased military control over contractor movements and improved communication between the military and PSCs. The impact of these increased oversight measures and norm density on coordination is reflected in the decreasing number of incidents (Table 3).​[64]​ 
However, not only did the PSCs’ performance improve, it was also better most of the time in comparison to the military. Compared to the Iraqi Army, the incident-personnel ratio of PSCs was almost always better (Table 4). Moreover, while the PSCs performance improved constantly since 2005, the Iraqi Army’s incident-personnel rate deteriorated after 2006. Indeed, the improvement is not perfectly synchronous with the quality of coordination; however, it still corroborates the general trend of improvement. Furthermore, the importance of coordination also becomes apparent in the case of the Iraqi Army. While the Iraqi was under US leadership until 2006, the incident-troop ratio improved. However, when coordination between the two forces was separated and the Iraqi Army took over its own operational planning, performance dropped again in 2006.​[65]​


Table 4










Likewise, the comparison of performance by PSCs and the US military yields similar results. While PSC performance was slightly inferior to that of the US military in the beginning, it improved significantly after coordination has been institutionalized (Table 5). While the intensity of fighting was picking up in 2006 and 2007, PSC performance nevertheless improved, and at the peak of the fighting in 2007, PSCs had an almost impeccable record of one incident per 30’000 PSC operators. 


Table 5



The data supports the neoliberal view. First, the coordination problem is not unique to PSCs, but occurs in any form of alliance. Second, PSC performance was good and even improved while the overall security situation deteriorated. This speaks to the robustness of the coordination. Third, in general, the improvement of PSCs performance is in accordance with the increasing quality of oversight. The last point is also supported by additional data. According to interviews conducted by the Government Accountability Office in 2005, security providers and military representatives believed that the ROC had increased coordination significantly.​[66]​ With the CONOC, the problem has apparently been solved. When the Special Investigator General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) asked 19 field commanders about the coordination issue, they described the new CONOC coordination procedures as effective, and none of them “identified any recent PSC activities that were inconsistent with their military operations”.​[67]​

Statists also consider PSCs to be aggressive actors due to the lack of restraining rules, while neoliberals disagree and deem PSCs to be restrained by norms of professionalism. Two indicators shed light on the question of PSC aggressiveness. First, if PSCs were overly aggressive, they should have more often initiated friendly fire incidents than receiving fire from friendly units. Out of the 68 incidents (all categories), PSCs initiated the firefight in 50% (34) of the cases; in 35% (24) of cases, they received fire, and in 15% (10) of the incidents, no categorization was possible. The high number of unknown cases does not allow a final conclusion to be drawn. However, based on the assumption that the data represents a normal distribution, PSCs appear to have a 1 to 1.3 ratio in receiving-initiating fire; i.e., for each incident in which they took fire, they initiated 1.3 friendly fire incidents. In contrast, the Iraqi forces initiated 333 friendly fire incidents (GB, GW), while they were fired upon in 134 cases (BG). This translates into a 1 to 2.48 ratio, i.e., for each incident of Iraqi troops taking fire, they initiated 2.48 friendly fire incidents. 
In comparison, US troops received fire in 213 cases (GB) and initiated fire in 133 incidents (BG). This equals a ratio of 1 to 0.6, i.e., for any each incident of US troops taking fire, they initiated fire 0.6 times. Out of the 22 BB incidents in which PSCs were involved, they were on the receiving end 13 times, initiated five incidents, and in four cases, the question of causation remains unknown. The ratio is therefore 1 to 0.38, i.e., for each friendly fire incident PSCs received, they initiated 0.38 firefights. 
In both cases, PSCs were less aggressive than their military counterparts. The results therefore do not support the statist claim that PSCs have a more aggressive attitude than military personnel. However, if the data is disaggregated, it indicates at least partial support for the statist argument, as not all PSCs display the same restraint in the use of force. The data reveals that local PSCs initiated firefights in 32% (19) of all cases compared to international PSC, which opened fire in only 7% (4) of the cases. The data on receiving fire further underscores the difference. While internationals took fire in 17% (10) of the cases, local PSCs in contrast only took fire in 3% (2) of incidents. Still, it is difficult to draw a final conclusion, since in 41% (24) of the cases, it is unknown who received or initiated fire. Based on the assumption that this represents a normal distribution, one could draw the tentative conclusion that local PSCs act more aggressively. This partially supports the statist argument that PSCs are more aggressive. However, it does not necessarily contradict the neoliberal argument. Neoliberals assume that professional PSCs are restrained by their professional norms. In general, local personnel are less professional than (most) international personnel and hence are more likely to initiate firefights than internationals. The latter finding is also supported by a RAND survey. The overwhelming majority (79%) of the surveyed military personnel who had experience with PSCs claimed that they had “never” or “rarely” had firsthand knowledge of contractors instigating direct or offensive action.​[68]​ Since most protection contracts for US personnel were held by highly professional international firms, such as Blackwater/Xe, DynCorp, Triple Canopy, HART, or Aegis, the military personnel most likely gathered their experience from the contact with these firms.
The second indicator shedding light on the question of PSC aggressiveness is the number of casualties resulting from PSC incidents. The assumption is that there is a relationship between aggressiveness and the number of casualties. In total, across all friendly fire categories, PSC-related incidents resulted in 55 casualties, including both injuries and deaths. On average, a single PSC incident thus caused 0.81 casualties. In contrast, the Iraqi military caused 640 casualties altogether in friendly fire incidents. On average, an incident thus resulted in 1.19 casualties. If the data is disaggregated and analyzed across time, PSCs almost always have a lower casualty-incident ratio than the regular Iraqi forces. Even in the two years when PSC-related incidents caused more casualties, the ratio was not exceptionally high. In fact, it always remained below the highest mark set by the Iraqi forces in 2009 (Table 6).  

Table 6

The US military had a very low incident-casualty ratio of 0.25 casualties per BB incident (86 casualties/345 incidents). Likewise, if only BB incidents are factored in, PSCs had a similar low casualty ratio of 0.17 casualties per incident (30 incident/5 casualties). If the data is disaggregated and analyzed across time, it corroborates that PSCs have rarely been more aggressive than regular military forces. With the exception of 2006, the casualty ratio was lower or almost similar to those of US troops (Table 7).

Table 7


In general, the data suggests that there is no pattern of PSCs being significantly more aggressive than regular troops. On the contrary, only in three instances (see Table 6: 2006 & 2007 and Table 7: 2006) did PSCs have a significantly higher incident casualty rate than the US or Iraqi troops. In all other instances (Table 6: 2004, 2005, 2008 and 2009; Table 7: 2004, 2005, 2007 and 2008), they had a similar or lower ratio. 
However, the neoliberal argument to professionalism suggests that there is a difference between professional and non-professional firms. A breakdown in local and international PSCs is very difficult, since out of 68 cases, only 43 can be attributed to either international (16) or local (27) firms. If the conclusion is based only on the available data, international PSCs appear to be less aggressive. They have caused 0.18 casualties per incident (three casualties in 16 incidents), while local PSCs have a casualty rate of 0.52 casualties per incident (14 casualties in 27 incidents). Due to the gaps in the data, the results need to be treated with caution. However, the findings seem to have a certain degree of substance, as the findings of the RAND survey also indicate that international PSCs act with restraint. The overwhelming majority of military personnel who had experience with contractors claimed that they had “never” or “rarely” had firsthand knowledge of contractors being unnecessarily threatening or belligerent.​[69]​ Again, it is likely that US personnel gathered their impression from the contact with highly professional firms.
Overall, the data does not support the statist claim of PSCs being aggressive in general. The neoliberal argument is rather supported. First, in most of the cases, PSCs had a better incident-casualty ratio or initiated firefights less often than regular troops. Especially in comparison with the less professional Iraqi military, PSC performance stood out. Second, even though non-professional PSCs behave more aggressively, their actions do not render PSCs more aggressive overall than the regular military forces. Third, the neoliberal argument of professionalism as a restraining factor is supported by the differences between local and international PSCs.   

Conclusion
The results seem to refute the statist criticism of co-deployed PSCs being an impediment to the military’s effectiveness and rather support the neoliberal view. Compared to regular military coalitions, PSCs do not appear to compromise coordination disproportionally. On the contrary, as the troop-incident ratio suggests, the Iraqi-US military coalition had more coordination problems than the PSCs-US military coalition. However, this is not a given fact, but the result of common operating rules and the improvement of the means of coordination. Without oversight, the incident personnel ratio indeed deteriorates; however, even then, the performance is equal to that of military unit. 
Moreover, in Iraq PSCs have also not proven to affect the legitimacy dimension of effectiveness disproportionally. They are not reckless and overtly aggressive actors, as the statists claim. On the contrary, as the neoliberals suggest, professional PSCs instead generally act with restraint. In most instances, the incident-casualty ratio was better than that of regular military forces, and they took fire more often than they initiated it. This is not to say that PSCs never employ excessive force, as the Nisour Square incident proves, yet there is no corroboration that this represents a pattern of PSC behavior in general. 
Indeed, local PSCs appear to employ force rather aggressively, and they have a higher casualty ratio and have initiated more firefights than international PSCs. However, this does not contradict the neoliberal view, as they argue that professionalism and oversight restrains PSCs, and local PSCs in Iraq are usually less professional and less controlled. Although this segment is responsible for most of the PSC-related casualties and initiated firefights, it still does not render PSCs more aggressive than regular troops.  The result therefore indicate that like any other military unit, the PSCs contribution to effectiveness depends on their professionalism and the common procedures shared with the members of the coalition. 
However, one should be cautious to generalize the result too quickly. First, the conclusions are based on only one case, the Iraq case. The argument would be greatly strengthened if it could be confirmed in another case, for instance, in Afghanistan. Little can be said of the overall coordination between PSCs and allied troops in Afghanistan as a comprehensive investigation of PSC employment is lacking. However, a study conducted by the U.S. Congress provides partial corroboration for some of the findings of this article. As in Iraq, in Afghanistan local PSCs appear to be much more aggressive than international PSCs.​[70]​ Second, it needs to be kept in mind that the results of this article rest partially on the comparison between PSCs and the Iraqi forces. The latter, however, underwent a build up phase and is therefore unable to display the same performance as highly professional seasoned forces. This is not to say that friendly fire incidents do not occur between highly trained forces. In Iraq, between the US and British army, for instance, at least eighteen blue on blue incidents occurred.​[71]​ Whether this represents a lower ratio of “blue on blue” incidents, compared to those with PSC involvement cannot be said without further investigation.
In sum, PSCs performance in the Iraq case indicates that these actors are not more of an impediment to coalition coordination and do not act worse than regular troops. If professional PSCs are contracted and oversight is sound, their performance supersedes that of poorly trained military personnel, such as the Iraqi military, and in some cases even that of the highly capable US military. 
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^3	  Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom ([Chicago]: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 36.
^4	  Krahmann, States, Citizens, and the Privatisation of Security, 34-35.
^5	  Risa Brooks, "Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness," in Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness, ed. Risa Brooks and Elizabeth Stanley (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2007), 9.
^6	   Thomas Adams, "The Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict," Paramenters, no. Summer (1999), Simon Chesterman, Leashing the Dogs of War: The Rise of Private Military and Security Companies, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No 08-24 (New York: New York University, 2008).
^7	   ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA Dina Rasor and Robert Bauman, Betraying Our Troops : The Destructive Results of Privatizing War, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 234, Peter W. Singer, "Can’t Win with ‘Em, Can’t Go to War without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency," in Policy Paper (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution2007). 
^8	  John Geddes, Highway to Hell : Dispatches from a Mercenary in Iraq, 1st ed. (New York: Broadway Books, 2008), 235-246.
^9	  Dominick Donald, After the Bubble. British Private Security Companies after Iraq, Whitehall Paper 66 (London: Royal United Services Insititute, 2006), 11, James Jay Carafano, Private Sector, Public Wars : Contractors in Combat-- Afghanistan, Iraq, and Future Conflicts, The Changing Face of War, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2008).
^10	  Rasor and Bauman, Betraying Our Troops : The Destructive Results of Privatizing War.
^11	  On September 16, 2007, Blackwater security guards allegedly shot and killed 17 Iraqi civilians. In December 2007, a Blackwater helicopter flew the Polish ambassador to safety after his motorcade had been ambushed.  
^12	  Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on Blackwater USA (Washington, D.C.2007), 20.
^13	  http://wikileaks.org/.
^14	  Addmittedly the debate in is not black and white. However, for the sake of drawing out the differences clearly it is justified to pit these two idealized perspectives against each other. For an extreme positive perspective on PSCs see: Carafano, Private Sector, Public Wars : Contractors in Combat-- Afghanistan, Iraq, and Future Conflicts, for an extreme negative view on PSCs see: Carmola, Private Security Contractors and New Wars : Risk, Law, and Ethics, a middle ground view is held by Carstens, Cohen, and Figueroa Küpçü, "Changing the Culture of Pentagon Contracting."
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Table 1: Friendly fire categoriesFriendly fire categoriesActors involvedBlue on BlueBlue on Green/Green on BlueGreen on GreenBlue on WhiteGreen on WhiteTotalMil.-Mil/ Civ.345347307811211201PSC-Mil./ Civ.2230011568PSC-PSC000--0Total367377307821361269Shaded cells are comprehensive categories, non-shaded are sample categories: The values represent the total count of incidents in the respective category.Table 2: PSC and US and Iraqi troop deployment (in thousand) in Iraq 2003-2009The actual size of the Iraqi Army was larger, but if the units were still in training or not able to conduct operations, they were not included in this analysis.Table 3: PSC number of incidents 2004-2009Table 4: Ratio of troops per incident (PSCs and Iraqi Army) No data available for 2009 available.Table 5: Ratio of troops per incident (US troops and PSCs) No data available for 2009.Table 6: Average casualty ratio per incident (PSCs and Iraqi Army)Table 7: Average casualty rate per incident (PSCs and US troops)No data was available for 2009.
